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Abstract3
As a significant emitter of greenhouse gases and a country rich in fossil fuels,
Russia plays a crucial role in achieving a comprehensive solution to climate-
related challenges. Yet, Russia’s official position on climate change has varied
considerably since the beginning of global negotiations, with the country playing
everything from policy leader to laggard. While there are a number factors that
shape domestic policy positions on climate change, this study offers a compre-
hensive investigation of newspaper coverage on climate change in Russia. How
have Russian newspapers discussed the issue since the Yeltsin era? We approach
this question by compiling the largest data set of Russian newspaper coverage
to date, which includes 11,131 climate-related articles from 65 papers over a
roughly 35 year period. After introducing a “computer assisted” approach to
measure the core themes running through climate change coverage, we statis-
tically evaluate the national- and newspaper-level factors associated with how
coverage is framed, focusing attention on 23 high circulation papers over the
period from 2000 to 2014. We find that national-level predictors—particularly
economic conditions—are highly influential of whether climate change is covered
and how the issue is framed, while paper-level factors such as the presence of
energy interest and ownership structure also have notable effects. Overall, this
study offers a rich data set and an array of methods to better understand the
drivers of climate communication in Russia.
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1. Introduction5
As the world’s fourth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, Russia remains a6
vital piece of any comprehensive and effective plan to mitigate the harmful effects7
of climate change (UNFCCC 2014). Although Russia played an ambiguous8
but, nevertheless, pivotal role in the Kyoto Protocol’s acceptance (Afionis and9
Chatzopoulos 2010, Andonova 2008), its current commitment to reducing GHG10
emissions remains unclear. Recently, Russia announced its withdrawal from the11
second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol (Bedritsky 2014), eliminated12
expenses on energy efficiency from the 2015 federal budget (Davydova 2015),13
and released a set of “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs)14
that could increase GHG emissions considerably above current levels by 203015
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(Levin and Damassa 2015). It is thus an open question as to whether Russia16
will be a leader or laggard in the pursuit to negotiate and implement an effective17
solution to challenges posed by anthropogenic global warming.18
Understanding Russia’s position on climate change policy requires careful19
consideration of the international and domestic factors that promote or impede20
cooperation. While a diverse array of factors have been suggested in the lit-21
erature, media coverage is seen to play a crucial role in various aspects of the22
climate debate. First, considering the agenda-setting function of mass media23
(McCombs and Shaw 1972) and its influence in shaping public opinion in Russia24
(White and Oates 2003), news coverage offers a useful means to discern domestic25
support for climate change action. Discerning public opinion is crucial, as only26
roughly 3 in 10 Russians believe that climate change is a serious problem and27
overall concern has decreased by roughly 10% since 2010 (Stokes et al. 2015).28
Second, mass media also play an important role in translating state views of29
climate change to national and international audiences, particularly in nations30
with limited press freedom (Bell 1994, Boyce and Lewis 2009, Boykoff 2012,31
Butler and Pidgeon 2009, Davidsen and Graham 2014, Dirikx and Gelders 2009,32
Doulton and Brown 2009, Grundmann and Scott 2012, Lockwood 2009, Lyy-33
tima¨ki 2011). Having a long history of close relations with the state, Russian34
media coverage often serves as a window into official government positions on35
climate policy and thus inform interested parties on how to understand Russia’s36
position at future climate change negotiations (Poberezhskaya 2015).37
Against this backdrop, we examine the evolution of Russian media discourse38
on global warming in the post-Soviet era. Although a number of studies ex-39
amine climate change-related communication in Russia (Poberezhskaya 2014;40
Tynkkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009; Yagodin 2010), past work is limited both41
in terms of time period under study and the number of media outlets examined.42
We contribute to the literature by 1) compiling the largest corpus of Russian43
newspaper coverage on the issue of climate change, collecting 11,131 relevant44
articles from 65 newspapers over the time period from May, 1980 to May, 2014;45
2) introduce a computer assisted approach to content analysis appropriate for46
a large corpus of documents; and 3) offer a multi-level statistical framework for47
assessing the drivers of media coverage in Russia. To our knowledge, this study48
offers the first large-scale analysis of Russian print media coverage of climate49
change that statistically evaluates how both paper and national level charac-50
teristics shape climate discourse. Overall, the evidence suggests that economic51
conditions are more likely than political factors to explain climate coverage,52
while paper-specific characteristics—such as energy interests, ownership struc-53
ture, and ideology—also play a role. Our study thus questions arguments on54
the predominant influence of political personalities over climate discourse in the55
country and suggests a range of alternative explanations for the media approach56
to the problem.57
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2. Media Coverage of Climate Change in Russia: Theory and Hy-58
potheses59
The importance of mass media in communicating climate change risks has60
been stressed by a variety of scholars (Bell 1994; Boyce and Lewis 2009; Boykoff61
2012; Butler and Pidgeon 2009; Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Davidsen and Gra-62
ham 2014; Dirikx and Gelders 2009; Doulton and Brown 2009; Grundmann and63
Scott 2012; Lockwood 2009; Lyytima¨ki 2011; Olausson 2009). Often the first64
point of contact between public and climate science, the media is tasked with the65
crucial role of interpreting the somewhat abstract and difficult to comprehend66
scientific discourse (Beck 1992; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Carvalho 2007; Nelkin67
1987 ; Rapley and De Meyer 2014). Olausson and Berglez (2014 p. 251) suggest68
that scholarly investigations of media coverage of climate change issues should69
expand inquiries of the power dynamics within national media discourses: “it70
is vital to examine who becomes the ‘primary definer’ of the climate issues.” In71
other words, it is crucial to identify the role of mass media in “setting the agenda”72
(Newell 2006; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Carvalho and Burgess 2005) and “fram-73
ing” the debate around the policy and science of global warming (Boykoff 2007a,74
Boykoff and Rajan 2007, Carvalho 2007).75
The media’s ability to define the issue of climate change does not take place76
in a vacuum—mass media both shapes and is shaped by social, political, and77
economic forces. Bailey et al. (2014 p. 199) note, in their comparative study of78
Spanish and American media coverage of climate change, that “media portrayals79
of climate (un)certainty are steeped in the historically contingent space of ideol-80
ogy, culture, and politics, where various actors and institutions battle to shape81
public understanding and engagement.” When studying the Russian case, one82
observes a historical progression marked by an ambiguous relationship between83
the media, the state, and key economic actors. Towards the end of the 1980s and84
in the early 1990s, the media became an influential actor in the regime change85
process through its increasingly open criticism of the old regime and growing86
support of emerging political actors (Coyne and Leeson 2009, Mickiewicz 1999,87
Strovskiy 2011, Voltmer 2000). During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the mass88
media’s political role swung from that of active support for the ruling elite to ex-89
treme criticism of some of its more questionable political decisions (for example,90
the war in Chechnya, see Grabel’nikov 2001). Furthermore, Yeltsin’s presidency91
was marked by the growth in power of the so-called “oligarchs” and their ex-92
panding control over the media market (Lipman and McFaul 2001; Zassoursky93
2001). The dawn of the Putin era in Russian politics further signified a move94
towards the centralisation of the media market and the re-establishment of state95
authority in the public discourse (Becker 2004; Zassoursky 2004). Moreover,96
when studying media coverage of climate change, it is important to consider97
that “oligarchs” and the state have close connections to the Russian fossil fuel98
industry, with such “gas giants” as Gazprom owning a vast number of national99
media outlets (Toepfl 2013). As will be discussed below, the interests of such100
owners are expected to shape newspaper coverage of climate change.101
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2.1. Presidency and Kremlin loyalty102
Richard Sakwa (2010: viii) argues that Russia is “a dual state” where “the103
legal-normative system based on constitutional order is challenged by shadowy104
arbitrary arrangements.” For example, it can be argued that power in the coun-105
try is disproportionately skewed towards the president or towards key political106
figures (for example, Putin’s personal domination over Russian politics (Hanson107
2010)). Regarding Russia’s climate policy, it has been suggested that stagna-108
tion in its development can be explained by Putin’s personal negative attitude109
towards this environmental problem (Henry and Sundstrom 2012). At the same110
time, the recent positive change in national climate affairs could be attributed to111
Medvedev’s striving for a green economy and modernisation (Monaghan 2012).112
Therefore, we suggest that while pro-Kremlin newspapers are expected to closely113
follow the state’s agenda on climate change, their coverage will adjust depending114
on whether Putin or Medvedev is in power. Where Putin’s presidency would115
have a negative impact on the quantity of articles and qualitatively on their con-116
tent, the discussion will steer away from the sensitive issues of domestic politics117
and emphasize the costs of climate action. Under Medvedev’s leadership, we118
expect to see an increase in coverage with more discussions dedicated to energy119
efficiency, international cooperation, domestic politics as well as science.120
2.2. Newspaper ownership, interests and ideology121
As Andonova (2008) argues, we cannot oversimplify Russia’s political pro-122
cess by narrowing it down to the changes at the executive level. Therefore, we123
need to consider a range of other societal and newspaper-level variables that124
may determine newspaper attention to climate change. By examining the UK125
quality press, (Carvalho 2007 p. 223) discusses how the media representation126
of climate change, “is strongly entangled with ideological standpoints.” In Rus-127
sia, the ideological orientation of the newspapers has to be treated with caution128
as the distinction between left, centre and right are often blurred and need to129
be treated in consideration with media ownership structures and their govern-130
mental links. That said, as demonstrated by previous research on the influence131
of the newspapers’ political leanings on their approach to climate change cov-132
erage (Carvalho and Burgess 2005, Carvalho 2007, Poberezhskaya 2015), we133
can suggest that oppositional newspapers (far-right and far-left) owned by non-134
governmental political parties will be very vocal across various topics as they can135
use climate change as an opportunity to criticise the state. Similar expectations136
(but to a lesser degree) could be expected from the newspapers whose majority137
shareholders are journalists, especially those on the political left. At the same138
time, the media outlets belonging to the political right and centre should be139
quite reserved in their climate coverage and likely eschew economically prob-140
lematic areas (e.g. Russia’s international obligations or fossil fuel industry). We141
expect that avoidance will also be intensified if a newspaper is owned by business142
interests or if it state-owned. At the same time, considering the nature of the cli-143
mate change problem, we hypothesise that newspapers with energy interests will144
avoid discussing the problem in the context of fossil fuels or renewable energy145
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development, and should also be less likely to discuss climate change overall.146
It should be noted that, throughout the studied years, the Russian newspapers’147
market has been dominated by the business led ownership structure with various148
degrees of their relations with the state (Lehtisaari 2015).149
2.3. National economic performance150
It has been argued that during economic recessions people tend to privi-151
lege financial stability over environmental security (e.g. Inglehart 1995, Scruggs152
and Benegal 2012, Shum 2012). For decades this has been the case for Russia153
where the environment has been persistently sacrificed to economic develop-154
ment (Henry 2010). Therefore, we can assume that economic crises (e.g. high155
inflation) should reduce newspaper attention to climate change, as the national156
economic well-being would take precedence. However, the state of the economy157
might also have an impact on what themes are focused on when climate change158
is indeed discussed. We posit that poor economic performance should be pos-159
itively associated with discussion of climate change in the context of economic160
opportunities (e.g. Arctic development, international cooperation and energy161
efficiency).162
2.4. Natural disasters163
There is some (but limited) evidence in the literature linking the influence164
of extreme weather events to media coverage of climate change (Shanahan and165
Good 2000, Boykoff and Boykoff 2007, Boykoff 2007b, Scha¨fer et al. 2014). How-166
ever, impacts of natural hazards on attention to global warming seem to also167
depend on various social, political, economic, and other country-specific factors.168
Current understanding suggests heterogeneous effects, with cross-national vari-169
ation in the intensity of the negative consequences of climate change on public170
discourse (e.g. Scha¨fer et al. 2014, Schmidt et al. 2013). However, there is evi-171
dence which indicates that warm temperature anomalies might impact individual172
attitudes toward climate change (Li et al. 2011, Zaval et al. 2014). Considering173
Russia’s growing climate vulnerability, we suggest that climate change related174
natural hazards should increase media attention to global warming. The 2010175
Russian heatwave, which resulted in the deaths of over 55,000 people and an es-176
timated economic loss of $15 billion (Barriopedro et al. 2011), was a catastrophic177
event that led to a strengthening of ecological groups in Russia (Yanitsky 2012).178
We therefore expect that when natural disasters occur, newspaper coverage of179
climate change should be more likely.180
3. Measuring Russian Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change, 2000-181
2014182
This study extends previous work on media coverage of climate change in183
Russia by incorporating an extensive list of Russian newspapers over a consid-184
erable period of time. To create the corpus, we retrieved newspaper articles185
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which contained the terms “climate change”, “global warming”, or “greenhouse186
effect” from the Eastview Russian Central Newspapers database (UDB-COM).187
This resulted in the identification of 11,131 relevant articles from 65 newspapers.188
The temporal coverage of the corpus is large, ranging from 3 May 1980 to 7 May189
2014. The full list of newspapers and article counts, along with an illustration190
of temporal variation in coverage for the entire period are presented in ??. Most191
newspapers entered the Eastview database in the late 1990s and early 2000s.192
Estimates of attention to climate change by the Russian press are therefore re-193
liable starting around 2000. It is for this reason that the analysis conducted in194
Section 4 relies on 6,527 articles from the 23 most circulated newspapers over195
the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014. Specifically, we focus the study on a sample of196
papers with moderate to high circulation counts, ranging from 85,000 (the social-197
political weekly magazine Itogi) to a maximum observed count of 2,985,000 (the198
national popular weekly Argumenty i fakty). We expect that newspapers with199
very large circulation figures are influential due to massive exposure and that200
newspapers with average circulations are likely to have more narrow audiences.201
However, these somewhat smaller papers (e.g. Kommersant) are also likely to202
be influential since they are more likely to target “elites” and opinion leaders.203
It is also important to note the potential limitations associated with focusing204
on newspapers to measure media coverage. As in many other countries around205
the world, the majority of Russians get their news from television, with over 90%206
of Russians tuning in each week (Broadcasting Board of Governors 2014, Deloitte207
CIS Research Centre 2016). Moreover, consistent with international trends in208
media consumption, the importance of online news has increased steadily over-209
time, particularly among younger individuals and those living in urban areas210
(Ibid). At the same time, print media remains an important source of news in211
general and political news in particular, with over 50% turing to newspapers212
and magazines for their news each week (Deloitte CIS Research Centre 2016).213
Figure 1 displays quarterly counts of climate change related articles for the214
23 most circulated Russian newspapers. Several features of aggregate media215
coverage based on the corpus are worth noting. Coverage of climate change in216
the Russian press maintained a steady increase until 2007, when we can observe a217
significant spike in attention. This finding is somewhat unexpected, as existing218
literature on Russian media coverage of climate change focuses on the period219
around 2009; prior years such as 2007 have been relatively ignored. Following a220
brief drop in coverage after 2007, there is a renewed spike in attention over the221
2009-2010 period (Copenhagen meeting and 2010 Russian heat wave), which is222
then followed by a steady decrease in coverage. This attention pattern, more or223
less, maps well with coverage rates from major American newspapers (Boykoff224
et al. 2015). However, as is clear from the plot, in terms of absolute coverage,225
Russian newspapers have devoted strikingly low attention to the issue when226
compared to the American press. Notably, the New York Times has published227
more climate change related articles than all prominent Russian papers combined228
for most of the 2000-2014 period.229
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Figure 1: The number of newspaper articles that mention climate change over time.
Displays quarterly counts of climate change related articles for the US “prestige press”
(Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today and Los Ange-
les Times) [black], the New York Times [grey], and the 23 most prominent Russian
newspapers based on circulation [orange]. US newspaper data are derived from Boykoff
et al. (2015). See ?? for a detailed list of the most prominent Russian newspapers.
3.1. Measuring climate-related themes: computer “assisted” content analysis230
While aggregate trends offer some insight into climate-related coverage, the231
obvious next question centers on what themes are prevalent in Russian newspa-232
pers. Past content analyses of climate change coverage rely almost exclusively233
on traditional methods based on human coders (Antilla 2008, Bailey et al. 2014,234
Olausson 2009, Shrestha et al. 2014, Taylor and Nathan 2002). These meth-235
ods are, however, extremely costly—in terms of both time and effort—and thus236
researchers are often forced to make important trade-offs, either constraining237
temporal coverage (c.f., Nissani 1999, Painter and Ashe 2012) or focusing on238
thoroughly reading a smaller, more manageable set of documents (c.f., Elsasser239
and Dunlap (2013), Dunlap and Jacques (2013)).240
Yet, if traditional content analytic methods do not scale to meet the needs241
of scholars of climate communication, it is essential to identify approaches that242
do. More recently, scholars have examined the “promise and pitfalls” of au-243
tomated classification methods across a range of common tasks in the social244
sciences (Grimmer and Stewart 2013), and for classifying news story content in245
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particular (Ali et al. 2010, Young and Soroka 2012). The promise of computa-246
tional methods is clear: they offer a reliable means to classify the primary topics247
or themes for large corpora of text (Mikhaylov et al. 2012). The drawback of248
computational methods, however, is that considerable effort must go into ensur-249
ing model validity (Quinn et al. 2010). In short, important trade-offs must be250
considered irrespective of whether an analyst chooses to employ traditional or251
automated forms of content analysis.252
We argue that much may be gained by combining aspects of both method-253
ologies. Consistent with recent literature on the use of text analytic models254
in the social sciences, our approach views computational methods as assisting,255
not replacing, traditional techniques (Grimmer and King 2011). Grimmer and256
Stewart (2013 p. 2) summarize this position quite well:257
“the complexity of language implies that automated content analysis258
methods will never replace careful and close reading of texts. Rather,259
the methods that we profile here are best thought of as amplifying260
and augmenting careful reading and thoughtful analysis.” (emphasis261
in original)262
As such, we analyze key themes in climate-related articles using an approach263
that strikes a balance between traditional methods based on human coding and264
recent advances in the field of natural language processing. Specifically, we265
employ the following three-step procedure:266
1. we first “augment” the corpus using an unsupervised algorithm to iden-267
tify meaningful topics (or clusters) in Russian newspapers and utilize the268
estimated topics to identify a small subset of documents that require a269
“careful and close reading;”270
2. use the results of step 1 and traditional inductive content analytic methods271
to code a sample of documents into a set of valid, reliable, and substantively272
meaningful themes;273
3. combine the results from steps 1 and 2 to develop a computational proce-274
dure for classifying the primary themes in the corpus, validating the model275
using common classification performance metrics (i.e., accuracy, precision,276
and recall).277
The remainder of this section briefly outlines our approach—a fuller description278
of all of the methods described in this section is available in the online appendix.279
3.1.1. Reducing dimensionality via unsupervised learning280
We begin with the observation that while reading 11,131 articles is practically281
infeasible, carefully assessing 100 key “topics” is much more attainable. As282
a first step, then, we need a method to reduce our overall corpus to a core283
set of topics or themes. To achieve this objective, we utilize the well-known284
latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model originally proposed in Blei et al. (2003).285
Viewing each document as a finite mixture of “topics” (i.e. meaningful clusters286
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of words), the LDA models the random process responsible for “generating” a287
particular text (see the supplemental appendix for technical details). While the288
Bayesian methods used to produce “topics” are a bit involved (see the appendix289
for details), the important point is that the LDA has been shown to preform290
well in a wide range of areas, from population biology to information retrieval,291
and thus provides a suitable method our data reduction task (Blei 2012 see).292
The results from estimating a 100 topic model are available in the appendix293
(see Table ??). Analyzing all 100 topics, however, is unwieldy and many top-294
ics deal with similar overarching themes. As such, there are substantive and295
practical benefits from further coding the topics into higher order themes that296
conform with key aspects of climate change coverage. To do this, we first cate-297
gorize topics into topic families or “meta-topics” using the topic keywords and,298
more importantly, the descriptive labels derived from a careful read of the top299
5 to 10 most probable documents. This procedure yielded a total of 23 sub-300
stantive meta-topics which cover themes related to science, energy, economics,301
international and domestic politics, and society. A full list of these meta-topics302
are displayed in Table 1 along with the labels and identification numbers of each303
meta-topic’s underlying topics, a measure of how often the meta-topic is sam-304
pled from the corpus (prevalence), and two classification accuracy scores which305
are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.2.306
3.1.2. Model validation307
A critical—if not the critical—step in any computer-assisted approach to308
content classification is model validation. If the specified model is working well,309
then the predicted primary topic or topics should correspond to the categories310
assigned by human coders. To construct a manually annotated set of documents311
to use for purposes of validation, we relied on the standard operating procedure312
of “inductive” content analysis: we use a small (randomly selected) set of docu-313
ments, classified the primary topic of each document using the 23 codes outlined314
in Table 1, discussed disagreements, and modified accordingly. More specifically,315
we repeated this inductive process until reliability was sufficiently high (Krip-316
pendorff’s α ≥ 0.80). After ensuring sufficient reliability, each individual coder317
classified the primary topic of 225 documents, leaving a total of 450 manually318
annotated for validation purposes.319
With a human-coded test set in hand, the next question is what criteria320
should be used to judge model validity. One approach is to draw on procedures321
commonly used to assess supervised learning problems, which include measuring322
some combination of classification accuracy, reliability, and precision. We rely on323
this approach here. Table 1 examines classification accuracy using the harmonic324
mean of precision and recall—i.e., the well-known and often used “F1 score”.325
First, we compare the primary (or “top”) topic suggested by the model to the326
primary topic identified by human coders. As demonstrated in Table 1, there327
is considerable variation in classification accuracy across the 23 categories, with328
the F1 score ranging from 0.84 (Health) to only 0.25 (Russian Cities). For329
the set of issues salient for the literature on Russian coverage of the climate330
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Meta-Topic Label Prevalence F1 Score Underlying Topic Label [ID]
Top Top 2
Activism 0.01 0.73 0.76 Activism (Protests) [26], Earth Hour [30]
Agriculture 0.01 0.59 0.74 Food security [42]
Arctic politics 0.01 0.82 0.87 Arctic geopolitics [4]
Climate impacts 0.08 0.54 0.76 Water resources [27], Sea level rise [31], Archeology [35],
Housing [36], Wild life [41], Sea life [69],
Climate impacts (Mountains and glaciers) [73],
Climate consequences (Scientific forecast) [90]
Climate science 0.08 0.53 0.76 Space (Celestial bodies) [19], Carbon emissions [22],
Meteorology (Roshydromet) [24], Space science (Sun) [49],
Climate science (Ocean and climate) [62], Climate change (General) [84],
Science (Atmosphere) [93]
Comparative politics 0.04 0.63 0.68 Politics (Germany) [5], Politics (USA) [20], Politics (UK) [33],
Politics (South America) [54], Politics (Elections) [68], IR (China) [95]
Disasters/Extreme weather 0.07 0.72 0.83 Nature disaster (Forest fires) [0], Weather abnormalities [39],
Catastrophe (Futuristic predictions) [45],
Nature disaster (Hurricanes and floods) [58],
Catastrophe (Response/MCHS) [60], Winter abnormalities [66]
Economy/Business 0.08 0.47 0.67 Budgeting climate risk [1], Business [6], Economy general [29],
Corporate responsibility [59], Economy (Sustainable development) [86]
Education 0.01 0.36 0.67 Education [23], Education (University competition) [52]
Non-renewable energy 0.02 0.61 0.81 Energy (nuclear) [48], Energy (gas) [99]
Renewable energy 0.01 0.50 0.78 Energy (Sustainable sources) [8]
Energy efficiency 0.02 0.43 0.67 Transport (Mostly aviation) [15], Transport (Cars) [17],
Energy (Efficiency, Emission reduction) [82]
Health 0.01 0.86 1.00 Health [47]
Information technology 0.004 0.50 0.80 IT [78]
Int’l climate agreements 0.03 0.84 0.91 Climate research (Russian-Belarusian) [10], Climate politics (COPs) [28],
Climate politics (Kyoto Protocol) [61]
International politics 0.05 0.53 0.71 UN (and Russia) [21], IR (ASIA-APEC) [34], Politics (EU) [53],
IR (Summits) [64], IR (Bilateral relations) [83]
International security 0.05 0.5 0.71 Russian national security [50], IR (Power politics) [55], Military [65],
Russian national security policy [67], IR (Security-conflicts) [94],
Russian foreign policy [98]
Polar science 0.01 0.75 0.89 Antarctic [12], Arctic (Science) [89]
Pollution 0.01 0.29 0.46 Env. protection (General pollution) [57], Env. protection (Air pollution) [87]
Russian cities 0.01 0.25 0.33 Moscow [79]
Domestic climate politics 0.04 0.49 0.74 Russian legislation [2], Medvedev’s politics (Russian politics) [9],
Politics (Russian officials meet) [13], Russian mitigation legislature [40],
Russian diplomacy [51], Russian Politics (Ministries/docs) [91]
Science (other) 0.02 0.67 0.73 Russian Science [71], Scientific discoveries (Genetics) [96]
Society and culture 0.10 0.44 0.70 Historical mysteries [3], Justice (crime) [7], Art (Film/music industry) [11],
Nobel Prize [88], Sport [97], Art (Music) [25], Philosophy [43],
Population growth [46], Fashion [63], USSR [70], Religion [74],
Literature [75], Politics and Society [76]
Table 1: Meta-topics and underlying topics within the newspaper corpus. This table
provides the meta-topics determined using the methodological approach outlined in
Section 3.1.1. “Prevalence” offers a rough measure of the importance of a meta-topic
to the corpus and is measured using the proportion of words assigned by the LDA to
a particular meta-topic over the sample period. The table presents two measures of
predictive accuracy using the F1 score (see Section 3.1.2 for a full description). Lastly,
we present the topic labels that underlie each meta-topic.
issue, meta-topics such as International Climate Agreements (0.84) and Arctic331
Politics (0.82) are classified accurately, while other themes such as Domestic332
Climate Politics (0.49) do not perform well.333
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Yet judging an LDA model based only on the primary topic alone offers a334
conservative assessment of model accuracy. Even a cursory glance at articles in335
the Russian media corpus suggests that a single story will often discuss multiple336
climate-related themes, and it is not always easy for either human or computer337
to decide on what topic is “primary.” To offer a less conservative assessment of338
predictive accuracy, we examine whether the model classifies the human-coded339
primary topic as either the first or the second most probable topic for each doc-340
ument in the sample. When doing so, the F1 scores improve considerably for341
several important climate-related themes (see Table 1). For instance, we ob-342
serve a sizeable increase in the F1 scores for energy-related themes, with both343
Non-renewable and Renewable Energy registering values near 0.80. Similarly, we344
observe a considerable increase in the F1 scores for the Climate Science and Cli-345
mate Impacts themes, as well as a dramatic improvement for Domestic climate346
politics and International security. Overall, while this analysis demonstrates a347
range of validity across the 23 meta-topics, we find reasonable predictive accu-348
racy for key climate-related themes.349
4. Explaining coverage: the correlates of climate change reporting350
We now turn to examining the correlates of climate change coverage. What351
societal- and newspaper-level factors explain variation in coverage on key climate-352
related issues in Russia? To examine this question, we focus on 23 newspapers353
for which sufficient data was available over the 2000 to 2014. These papers rep-354
resent a substantial percentage of the overall circulation in Russia and include355
a representative cross-section of papers based on ownership structure, politi-356
cal ideology, and ties to the Russian central government (see appendix table357
A.2). The remainder of this section outlines our variables of interest, statistical358
methodology, and presents our main empirical findings.359
4.1. Outcome variables360
The 23 meta-topics in Table 1 offer a detailed set of themes for measuring361
the intensity of climate coverage. Yet, to keep the analysis manageable, we fo-362
cus our attention on three sets of meta-topics that 1) cover salient themes that363
are important in the Russian climate change literature (Poberezhskaya 2014;364
Tynkkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009; Yagodin 2010) and 2) exhibit reasonable365
levels of predictive accuracy (F1 top 2 > 0.70). First, we examine the intensity366
of coverage for two key aspects of climate change by combining climate science367
and climate impacts (see Table 1) into climate science & impacts. This variable368
represents a core aspect of climate literacy and provides a useful means to gauge369
coverage of climate change fundamentals. Second, we combine international se-370
curity and arctic politics into geopolitics, which centers on discussions of climate371
change in the context of international relations. Further, we seek to explain vari-372
ation in how Russian newspapers have reported on climate change negotiations373
by investigating the international climate agreements meta-topic. Lastly, we in-374
vestigate the variation in newspaper attention on energy-related themes within375
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the context of climate change by combining non-renewable energy, renewable376
energy, and energy efficiency into energy issues. Time-series plots of these out-377
come variables over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014 are illustrated in Figure ??,378
which can be found in ?? of the supplemental appendix.379
The obvious next step involves determining an operational definition for the380
selected themes. As described in Boussalis and Coan (2016), there is no agreed381
upon “best” strategy for generating measures from underlying topic data and the382
appropriateness of a particular strategy is contingent on the research question of383
interest. Given the literature on Russian climate communication, our primary384
interest is in determining how papers frame the climate issue and whether the385
framing changes according to national- and newspaper-level factors. In particu-386
lar, we examine how different papers make trade-offs when discussing different387
climate-related themes, focusing on the proportion of all words devoted to a388
particular meta-topic in Table 1 for each paper-quarter. As such, this measure389
allows us to examine under what context a particular paper discusses the issue390
of climate change.391
4.2. National and newspaper-level covariates392
We also focus on national and newspaper-level covariates considered impor-393
tant in the communications literature. Classifying Russian newspapers’ own-394
ership, ideology and their relations with the state has proven to be a difficult395
task for researchers, and as Koltsova (2006) notes due to the rapid and constant396
changes in the Russian media market, these variables often remain a mystery397
even to market actors. In order to eliminate as many coding inaccuracies as398
possible, we have consulted a range of sources including: web-pages of the stud-399
ied newspapers, publicly available databases (e.g. media-atlas.ru, mediageo.ru)400
and relevant literature sources (e.g. Nenashev 2010, Strovskiy 2011, Zassoursky401
2004). To account for national level variables which may influence newspaper402
coverage of climate change, we control for consumer prices and the occurrence403
of extreme temperature, drought and storm events. A list of the variables along404
with their levels and descriptions are presented in Table 2.405
4.3. Statistical methods406
The next challenge is finding a suitable statistical model to examine variation407
in climate coverage as a function of key covariates. We assume that decisions408
regarding climate coverage result from a mixture of two random processes: news-409
papers first decide whether to discuss the issue of climate change at a given point410
in time and next decide how much coverage to devote to a particular theme.411
More specifically, we model climate coverage using a mixture of a Bernoulli412
distribution for the decision to cover the issue at all and a beta distribution413
to represent coverage intensity (see the appendix for technical details). While a414
Bernoulli-beta mixture model offers a flexible approach to examining the skewed415
and zero-inflated proportions that are typical in our data, the standard setup416
ignores the clustering produced by examining a cross-section of newspapers over417
time. We thus extend the standard model to include random effects for both418
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Variable Label Levels Description
Ownership structure Business Ownership structure is dominated by the business
organisations with interests outside of the media market
State Predominately state-owned newspapers
Journalist collective Predominately owned by people with main
interests in the media market
Political party Owned by oppositional political parties
Energy Yes Owners have interests in energy sector
No No obvious connection with energy sector
Political spectrum Left Supports or advocates socialist/communist ideas
Centre Supports or advocates ideas of political and economic
stability, and traditional values
Right Supports or advocates ideas of capitalism and liberalism
Kremlin affiliation Pro-Kremlin Non-state owned paper supports government in power
Independent No obvious support for the government in power
from non-state owned paper
Inflation Mean = 11.78 Average quarterly consumer prices (all items),
SD = 5.04 percentage change on the same period
of the previous year (OECD 2016).
Disasters Mean = 0.67 Quarterly counts of extreme temperature,
SD = 1.00 drought and storm events (Guha-Sapir et al. 2015).
Table 2: National and newspaper-level variables and descriptions. Note: The identi-
fication of the Russian political spectrum is a complex task, as notions of the political
“right”, “centre” and “left” have been altered and even swapped over time (see more
in Simonsen 2001). In this article we have adopted the most common interpretation of
the concepts. Summary statistics and descriptions are also presented for Inflation and
Disasters.
the newspaper (n = 23 papers) and time (t = 58 quarters). All of the models419
presented below are estimated using a fully Bayesian approach (see the appendix420
for additional details).421
4.4. Results422
We begin with the first step in the data generating process by examining the423
factors that influence whether or not a paper covers climate change at all in a424
particular quarter. Figure 2 provides estimates from a logistic regression for the425
decision to cover the climate issue, where the outcome is equal to 1 if a paper426
mentions climate change in a given quarter and zero otherwise. The figure plots427
the estimated coefficients (log odds) for each variable of interest based on the428
median posterior value, while also providing 90% credible intervals. To ease the429
interpretation, we set the baseline category to the group expected, a priori, to430
have the most overall coverage of climate change based on the past scholarship:431
left-leaning papers, owned by journalists, without a direct energy interest, and432
not beholden to the Kremlin (Poberezhskaya 2015). The results generally fit with433
expectations. The overall state of the economy—as measured by inflation—has434
the largest overall influence on the probability of covering the climate issue. Not435
surprisingly, when times are tough economically, climate change is less likely436
to appear in the news agenda: moving inflation from its minimum to maximum437
value—while fixing all other variables at constant values—leads to a 0.10 decline438
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Figure 2: Explaining variation of any mention of climate change. Dots represent
parameter estimates based on the posterior median; lines provide the 90% highest
density intervals. The baseline represents the newspaper profile expected to cover
climate change most frequently: left leaning, journalist-owned newspapers, with no
direct energy interest, and not affiliated with the Kremlin. The estimated coefficient
for the intercept (not shown) is 5.7 (HDI = [2.8, 8.5]).
in the probability of covering climate change. This level of change, however,439
represents a considerable swing in economic conditions and, for more moderate440
changes (e.g., from the 1st to the 3rd quartile of inflation), inflation leads to a441
roughly 1% decline in discussing climate-related issues. Energy ownership also442
reduces the propensity of a newspaper to report on climate-related issues, with443
the likelihood of covering climate change again falling by roughly 1% for papers444
owned by an energy company. Lastly, opposition party papers are approximately445
2% less likely to mention climate change at all—though, this estimate is quite446
uncertain. We do not find a significant difference in the likelihood of climate447
change coverage between Putin or Medvedev presidential periods. Further, we448
do not find a significant conditional relationship between presidential period449
and state-owned or Kremlin-loyal papers on the probability of covering climate450
change (not shown).451
Examining mentions alone, however, offers little insight into how climate452
change is being covered in the Russian press. That is, if a paper decides to cover453
the climate issue, in what context do they do so? To examine this question,454
we use the relative measure of coverage intensity introduced in Section 4.1 and455
the mixed effects zero-inflated beta model outlined in Section 4.3. We begin456
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with two central features of climate change communication—reporting on cli-457
mate science & impacts. As demonstrated in Figure 3, we find support for the458
impact of national-level variables on coverage of climate science in the Russian459
press. Specifically, we find that if a paper covers climate change during times of460
high inflation, the discussion is less likely to be framed around climate science461
(log-odds = -1.03, CI = [-1.96, -0.26]). Moving inflation from one standard de-462
viation above to one standard deviation below the mean leads to around an 8%463
decline in the likelihood of emphasizing climate science and impacts. Conversely,464
during periods with high instances of natural disaster, coverage is more likely465
to emphasize scientific discussion (log-odds = 0.07, CI = [0.02, 0.13]). Here,466
moving from no extreme weather events to 4 extreme weather events (i.e., the467
maximum), increases the likelihood of framing discussion in terms of climate468
science and impacts by roughly 7%. There does not seem to be a substantive469
presidential effect on how newspapers discuss climate science & impacts. Fur-470
ther, by and large, there is little evidence for newspaper-level effects. There are,471
however, several exceptions: right-leaning (log-odds = -0.22, CI = [-0.64, 0.18])472
and opposition party papers (log-odds = -0.40, CI = [-0.93, 0.11]) are generally473
less likely to emphasize science, while state-owned newspapers are more likely474
to focus on science-related issues (log-odds = 0.30, CI = [-0.10, 0.72])—though,475
again, uncertainty remains relatively high for these estimates.476
Next, we move beyond science to issues associated with the political econ-477
omy of climate change in Russia. Figure 3 provides estimates for our aggregate478
measure of geopolitics. As shown in the figure, both paper-level and national-479
level factors seem to play a role in the level of climate-related discussion devoted480
to geopolitical issues. Considering paper-level variables, energy ownership in-481
fluences discussion of geopolitics, yet papers with energy interests are only less482
than 1% more likely to cover climate change in the context of international rela-483
tions. Oppositional party papers are also more likely to frame climate coverage484
in the context of security concerns and international competition over the Arc-485
tic region (log-odds = 0.52, CI = [0.07, 0.97]). To a lesser extent, right-leaning486
and state-owned papers are more likely to cover climate change in the context487
of geopolitics—though, there is still a fair level of uncertainty associated with488
both estimates. And we continue to find evidence for the influence of economic489
conditions; when inflation is high, papers are more likely to frame the climate490
change debate in terms of geopolitical competition. Further, when disaggregat-491
ing geopolitics into international security and arctic politics (not shown), we find492
that security is largely responsible for driving geopolitical frames. That is, the493
effects of energy and opposition party ownership as well as inflation are stronger494
when focusing on international security alone. There does seem to be a marginal495
presidential effect. Specifically, we find that during a Putin presidency, papers496
are less likely (log-odds = -0.15, CI = [-0.31, -0.01]) to discuss climate change in497
the context of geopolitics, however the effect is quite small: newspapers under a498
Putin presidency are only 0.4% less likely to frame global warming in terms of499
geopolitical concerns.500
The analysis next shifts to climate change discussions in the context of in-501
15
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Climate Science and Impacts Geopolitics
Energy Issues Int'l Agreements
Disasters
Inflation
Energy
Business (owner)
Opp. Party (owner)
State (owner)
Center
Right
Kremlin
Putin
Disasters
Inflation
Energy
Business (owner)
Opp. Party (owner)
State (owner)
Center
Right
Kremlin
Putin
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2
Log Odds
Figure 3: Coverage of specific climate-related issues. Dots represent the parameter
estimates (posterior medians) from the zero-inflated beta regression model described
in Section 4.3, and the lines once again represent the 90% HDI. We employ the same
baseline as Figure 2 above and thus compare to a “high frequency” newspaper profile.
The estimated intercepts (not shown) are as follows: climate science and impacts (-
0.59, [-1.55, 0.32]), geopolitics (-4.55, [-5.68, -3.48]), energy issues (-3.46, [-4.42, -2.60]),
and international agreements (-2.22, [-3.74, -0.74]).
ternational climate agreements. Again, economic hardship, as measured by in-502
flation, has a negative impact on newspaper attention to climate change nego-503
tiations (log-odds = -1.60, CI = [-3.08, -0.28]). For instance, moving inflation504
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above, de-505
creases discussion on global warming negotiations by roughly 4%. With respect506
to newspaper-level variables, the results suggest that state- (log-odds = 0.47, CI507
= [0.0001, 0.90]) and business-owned newspapers (log-odds = 0.36, CI = [0.14,508
0.59]) are more likely to frame global warming along the lines of climate diplo-509
macy. Substantively, government ownership is associated with an approximate510
16
5% increase in discussion, while business group ownership leads to a roughly 4%511
increase.512
Lastly, we examine the extent to which newspapers frame climate coverage513
in terms of energy issues. Not surprisingly, business-owned newspapers are more514
likely to emphasize climate change in the context of energy issues (log-odds =515
0.20, CI = [0.03, 0.39]). Yet, the strongest newspaper-level effects are observed516
for state-owned (log-odds = 0.45, CI = [0.08, 0.82]) and opposition party papers517
(log-odds = -0.40, CI = [-0.78, -0.06]). State-owned papers are approximately 2%518
more likely to highlight energy issues when covering global warming, while op-519
position party papers are 2% less likely to do so. When digging a bit deeper into520
these estimates, we find that attention devoted to renewable energy and energy521
efficiency play a particularly influential role. While we observe weak differences522
across papers for non-renewable energy, business- and state-owned papers have523
a strong positive influence on the likelihood of framing climate change in terms524
of “energy solutions,” while opposition party outlets generally avoid discussion525
of these issues. We also find a negative effect of a Putin presidency on discus-526
sions of climate change with respect to energy issues (log-odds = -0.17, CI =527
[-0.36, -0.002]). However, yet again, this effect is substantively small: newspa-528
pers during a Putin presidency are 0.2% less likely to discuss climate change in529
the context of energy.530
5. Discussion531
Newspaper attention to climate change has risen steadily ever since the issue532
was identified as an international problem. A key question for both scholars533
of climate communication and Russian politics centers on the similarities and534
differences of Russian media coverage to other major actors in climate politics.535
We start by considering overall trends in coverage of the issue. Boykoff et al.536
(2015) demonstrates how interest by the global press increased rapidly starting537
in late 2006 and remained high for the following few years (see also Schmidt et al.538
2013). This increase coincided with important events such as the release of the539
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the release of Al Gore’s An Inconvinient540
Truth, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC.541
There is another pronounced spike in attention in late 2009 that was triggered by542
the Copenhagen Conference (COP-15) on climate change and the “Climategate”543
scandal that preceded it. Our data suggest that Russian newspaper attention544
generally followed this pattern and, in particular, we find noticeable similarities545
between Russian coverage and that of the U.S. prestige press (see Figure 1). Yet,546
although the general trends are similar, there are several key differences. First,547
and perhaps most importantly, our analysis confirms that Russian newspaper548
coverage of climate change is relatively low in absolute terms (Poberezhskaya549
2015). As demonstrated in Figure 1, a single major American newspaper (The550
New York Times) has published more articles on climate change than 23 of551
the most widely circulated papers in Russia. This low level of media attention552
may offer an explanation of why, when compared to 40 developing and developed553
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nations, Russians are the most likely to report that “global climate change is not554
a serious problem” (Stokes et al. 2015). Second, while it seems that international555
media have picked up their interest in climate change in recent years and it has556
again acquired “celebrity status” (Pepermans and Maeseele 2014 p. 217; see557
also Fischer 2015), we find that Russian newspaper coverage has been steadily558
decreasing since 2010, with a pronounced drop starting in late 2013. This decline559
in coverage, moreover, corresponds to an increase in media attention associated560
with the Russian economic crisis and the onset of the security crisis in Ukraine.561
Next, moving from trends in general attention to the correlates Russian cli-562
mate coverage, we find that the state of the economy is crucial for predicting563
both whether climate change makes onto the media agenda and the way in which564
the issue is framed. When economic conditions are bad (as measured by high565
inflation), the media tend to avoid discussion of global warming and discuss cli-566
mate change less in the context of science and international commitments, but567
more with respect to geopolitical concerns. In other words, instead of portraying568
climate change as an environmental problem, during hard times, the media will569
present climate change as just another item of discussion in the international570
arena, outlining opportunities which could be realized with a shift in global571
climate conditions. The influence of the economy on climate change commu-572
nication has been identified in other countries as well. For instance, Carvalho573
(2005 , p. 21), in her analysis of the UK media points out how “free-market574
capitalism and neo-liberalism” restrict climate public discourse by encouraging575
the avoidance of problematic topics (e.g. restrictions of the economic growth in576
order to mitigate the problem). Holt and Barkemeyer (2012) also find negative577
effects of poor national economic performance on coverage of climate change in a578
large comparative study of 112 newspapers from 39 countries. As such, our anal-579
ysis provides additional evidence that economic conditions plays an important580
role in governing the well-known “issue attention cycle” (Downs 1972).581
Previous research also suggests that Russian media coverage of climate change582
is sensitive to political factors (Poberezhskaya 2015). Interestingly, our study583
provides little evidence of substantive variation in climate change coverage or584
attention to various climate change related themes between different presiden-585
tial administrations (Putin vs. Medvedev). Further, we do not find conditional586
presidential administration effects on how state-owned newspapers or papers587
that are loyal to the Kremlin discuss climate change. That is, newspapers that588
are beholden to the government do not discuss global warming differently when589
Putin or Medvedev are serving as President. Also, non-state-owned newspapers590
that are loyal to the Kremlin do not seem to systematically differ from the base-591
line case in their reporting of global warming. These results contribute to the592
on-going academic debate on the role of the personality of the state leaders in593
shaping climate discussion in Russia (Henry and Sundstrom 2012). The weak594
evidence found in our study could be explained by the constant powerful impact595
of Putin’s politics regardless of whether he is the Prime Minister or President.596
On the other hand, as Andonova (2008) states, Russian climate policy cannot597
simply be explained by the will of the executive but rather by a combination of598
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various political processes.599
We also find a much weaker role for natural disasters in explaining variation in600
coverage of global warming and framing of the issue by the Russian press. Our601
results indicate that the occurrence of climate-related natural hazards, such602
as extreme temperature, drought and storms, are associated with an increase603
in discussions of climate science and climate impact. However, we find little604
evidence of a disaster effect on overall coverage rates or discussion of energy,605
geopolitics, or international climate negotiations. Given these findings, we might606
speculate that natural disasters bring climate change to the realm of popular607
scientific discourse by trying to explain events, providing advice or raising the608
alarm of the observed (or possible) negative outcomes. This correlates with609
Wilson Rowe’s (2013) argument that while Russian climate scientists rarely act610
as “policy entrepreneurs” but rather concentrate on educating policy-makers611
and the public by explaining the scientific side of the problem.612
While national-level factors are predictive, paper-level characteristics also613
play a role, with papers varying in how they frame the issue. In terms of news-614
papers’ political affiliation and ownership, there is some evidence to suggest615
that the media outlets on the political right are less likely to address climate616
change in terms of science and impact. However, when such papers do discuss617
climate science, they typically provide a rational account of anthropogenic cli-618
mate change with descriptions of its cause and consequences. Newspapers on619
the extreme political left and right bring into their discussion of climate science620
sensationalism and in some cases governmental critique:621
The region is not yet experiencing climatic difficulties, and its prob-622
lems are due to the irrational management of agricultural production623
and water waste (Pravda 9/01/2004)624
On the other hand, newspapers of the political center express a range of views625
on the issue. Moreover, when taking a closer look at the corpus—particularly626
among state-owned papers—there are clear instances of climate scepticism. For627
instance:628
Global warming will soon finish (Rossiiskaia gazeta 19/09/2007)629
Maybe the president’s advisor, Andrey Illarionov [an infamous Rus-630
sian climate sceptic], is right in his stubborn resistance to the Kyoto631
Protocol? (Rossiiskaia gazeta 31/08/2005)632
This finding also correlates with the development of the state’s climate policy,633
which until a few years ago was dominated by sceptical discourse. Newspapers634
with connections to the energy sector mostly tend to look at the problem from635
the position of international security which often involves discussion of Russian636
energy interests. For instance, when surveying climate-related articles in our637
corpus with a high probability of containing a topic related to geopolitics, we638
found numerous discussions of global competition for the Arctic’s resources by639
papers with energy interests:640
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Russia continues to strengthen its positions in the unavoidable divi-641
sion of the Arctic [...] The Arctic shelf presumably contains up to642
25 per cent of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves, and in connection643
with global warming, the possibility of their extraction becomes real.644
(Izvestiia 24/12/2008)645
A similar pattern was detected with oppositional and right-wing newspapers also646
being more likely to discuss climate change in relation to international relations.647
However, these papers differ slightly in their approach, where the media outlets648
from the political right provide a more straightforward account of the potential649
losses and gains in the geopolitics of climate change. In contrast, newspapers650
belonging to the extreme left and right tend to briefly mention climate change651
in their elaborate analyses of global politics:652
Today Anglophone plans are implemented under the guise of a state-653
less “globalization” and ultra-Malthusian scam called “global warm-654
ing,” pushed by former US Vice President Al Gore’ (Zavtra 18/4/2007)655
Our study also demonstrates that ownership structures impact the way Rus-656
sian newspapers approach energy-related topics, with business-owned and state-657
owned papers not only mentioning climate change within energy discussions658
more often, but also paying greater attention to “energy solutions” (e.g., renew-659
ables and energy efficiency). Izvestiia, for example, has pointed to American660
excess when discussing how, “until recently uneconomical and environmentally661
‘dirty’ cars were the most popular choice among American consumers” (Izvestiia662
13/02/2004). Business owned papers were likely to express an interest in energy663
conservation as well:664
The country has a long-term commitment to provide energy for ex-665
port. It is currently almost the only real means of Russia’s political666
influence [...] Therefore, Russia has to seriously think about a more667
rational use of its energy resources, as well as of the use of energy-668
saving technologies’ (Kommersant 19/10/2005).669
A similar pattern was noticed in how these types of newspapers tackle the topic of670
international environmental agreements by strategically assessing Russia’s gains671
and losses from the process:672
Russia needs to fit into a new global climate order. While Russia does673
not persevere in promoting their GHG emission reduction projects, in674
April 2009 a new US administration has claimed its global leadership675
in the fight to preserve the environment and to development the ideas676
of global “climate control” (Rossiiskaia gazeta 6/05/2009).677
Our data also show how media coverage is influenced by similar considerations as678
the Russian state’s climate policy. Interest in the issue began to “take off” after679
policy makers began to consider mitigation efforts for their potential benefits to680
the country (e.g. introducing renewables into the national market in order to681
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increase fossil fuel exports , reducing energy costs, attracting investments, etc.).682
Though this approach may be seen as “green washing,” in the Russian case, it683
offers a tangible—and even optimal—solution for attracting the interest of the684
state. Moreover, this approach allows for increased attention without causing a685
political confrontation among key stakeholders by demanding economic sacrifice686
and allocating blame for over-reliance on the fossil fuel industry.687
6. Conclusion688
This study offers a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Russian news-689
paper coverage and discussion of climate change since the end of the Yeltsin era.690
Employing methods from machine learning and natural language processing, we691
have been able to classify a large set of climate-relevant newspaper articles into692
distinct themes related to global warming. Using a sub-sample from these data,693
we investigate whether a set of national and newspaper-level factors help ex-694
plain variation in Russian newspaper coverage of climate change as well as how695
newspapers frame the issue over the period 2000-2014. Overall, our analysis696
has helped us to understand when climate change is more or less likely to enter697
Russian public discourse (the first level of the agenda-setting function of mass698
media (McCombs and Shaw 1972), and how newspapers cover climate change699
during its peaks and lows of attention (the second level of media agenda-setting700
function (ibid)). We find that national level factors such as the state of the701
economy are highly predictive of coverage, while paper-level indicators are less702
consistently related to changes in the media discourse.703
While the current study focuses on the issue of climate change, our empirical704
findings raise broader questions on the political economy of media production in705
Russia. First, it is clear from our analysis that economic considerations—general706
economic conditions and energy interests—play a vital role in what the media707
choose to present. Second, it is striking just how little variation one observes708
across newspapers with very different underlying ideologies and ownership struc-709
tures. These findings, moreover, are at odds with scholarship based on West-710
ern countries—primarily in the US and UK—which suggests that the ideological711
predispositions of media outlets significantly influence which issues are discussed712
and how these issues are framed (for ideology and climate change coverage, see713
for instance Carvalho 2007, Schmid-Petri et al. 2015), though there is evidence714
that Dutch newspapers are also not affected by ideological disposition on the715
issue of climate change (Dirikx and Gelders 2010). Similarly, changes at the ex-716
ecutive level—from an arguably skeptical Putin to the environmentally-minded717
Medvedev—did not appear to systematically alter how the media covered climate718
change. And though speculative, the consistency of coverage across (seemingly)719
diverse media outlets underscores the challenge of getting the issue of climate720
change onto the political agenda and perhaps offers an observable implication721
of wider changes in the Russian media market, which has become increasingly722
centralized and controlled over the last decade (Lehtisaari 2015). While it is723
difficult to know the extent to which these findings generalize to other political724
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issues, the analysis does raise questions regarding how media operate in Russia725
and the ways in which corporate elite influence the media landscape.726
The study does, however, have a number of limitations. First, our analysis727
does not consider the sentiment and tone of the newspaper articles. For instance,728
when a paper is discussing climate science, we cannot determine whether the729
author is being skeptical or dismissive. This is an important drawback which730
should be addressed in future work. Second, the study relies exclusively on731
print media, while not including television, radio, and online media, which might732
present a more complete picture of climate discourse in Russia. Lastly, due to733
data availability, we were forced to exclude newspaper articles from the Yeltsin734
era. We, therefore, are not able to generalize our findings on newspaper coverage735
to the 1990s.736
Nevertheless, our results offer a number of valuable insights into climate737
change communication in Russia. During the Paris COP-21 meeting in Septem-738
ber 2015, President Putin re-affirmed Russia’s pledge to contribute to the global739
fight against climate change through further GHG reductions. Some have thought740
that Putin could have been more ambitious in his claim since a reduction of 25-741
30% in GHG emissions to the 1990 level will not revolutionize Russia’s energy742
market. On the other hand, considering Russia’s ambiguous history of climate743
change policy, any move forward should be treated as a positive development744
where the interested parties (climatologists, environmental activists and the in-745
ternational community) should not only understand all of the intricacies of Rus-746
sian climate discourse but should also learn how Russian media can be utilized747
in order to popularize climate-related discussions. In other words, focus should748
be shifted to when climate is more likely to receive attention from the Russian749
media and how it can be framed in order to involve various media actors re-750
gardless of their ownership structure, energy interests and political affiliation.751
It is our belief that this study makes a substantial contribution in this regard752
and can also be utilized as a platform for further inquiries into Russian public753
discourse of climate change-related topics.754
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